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disclaimers apply.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the most interesting recent institutional developments in world economies is a
marked and widespread tendency toward decentralization within countries accompanied
by an enlargement of international unions among countries. In the nineties about 95% of
all countries in the world undertook steps toward a decentralization of functions to local
governments. In some cases, this tendency was so strong to bring about the dissolution of
previously existing political entities (Bolton et al., 1996, Alesina et al., 2000). At the same
time, new international forms of cooperation where established (i.e. the Nafta treaty) and
old ones were expanded (i.e. the European Union). These events generated a renewed in-
terest by academic economists on the issue of the optimal organization of governments (e.g.
Besley and Coate, 2002, Lockwood, 2002, Bordignon et al., 2001, Alesina et al., 2003). On
average, this scrutiny tended to conﬁrm Oates’s (1972) intuition on the existence of poten-
tially important eﬃciency gains associated with decentralization. However, some policy
oriented economists remained highly skeptical. For example, in a very inﬂuential policy
paper, Prud’homme (1995) severely warned against “the dangers of decentralization”. His
main (eﬃciency) argument against decentralization lies in a (presumed) stronger inﬂuence
of corruption and lobbying by local interest groups on local governments. Recent empirical
studies do not substantiate this hypothesis (e.g. Fisman and Gatti, 2002). Nonetheless,
it is quite common to hear Prud’homme’s type of arguments being repeated in political
and economic circles as, for example, in the recent debate on whether competition policy
should remain in the hands of the European Commission or being partly decentralized to
member countries. The issue seems therefore to deserve a more detailed analysis.
Surprisingly enough, while there is a large economic literature on interest groups’ in-
ﬂuence on policy (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2001), very few studies have concentrated
on the speciﬁc issue of the relationship between interest groups and decentralization. De
Melo et al. (1993) ﬁnd a positive correlation between decentralization and lobbying, due
to the existence of a preference dilution eﬀect. More recently, Redoano (2002) shows that
the net eﬀect of decentralization on lobbying is a priori uncertain. However, these studies
only focus on the higher heterogeneity of preferences under centralization as the main
engine for lobbies’ formation and inﬂuence. Prud’homme’s argument, on the other hand,
has nothing to do with preferences heterogeneity. It relies instead on a greater “dispo-
sition” by local governments to “accept” pressures from local interests, presumably due
to the fact that supporting a local interest may generate additional beneﬁts for the local
politician than supporting an external one.
To focus on this issue, we build a simple general equilibrium model in which we abstract
entirely from heterogeneity of preferences. In our model, there are two regions, one resident
ﬁrm and a large mass of consumers in each region owning the local ﬁrm. The two ﬁrms may
serve both local markets and in all cases they have an incentive to lobby the governments
in charge either to gain access to the local markets or to increase the production of a local
public good which is complementary in consumption to the good they sell. We focus on two
polar cases, one where all decisions are taken at the central level and the other where all
decisions are taken at local level. For simplicity, and also because these eﬀects are already
well understood, we abstract entirely from “common pool” eﬀects which may arise out of
transfers from the central level to the local one (Persson, 1998), as well as from “ﬁscal
competition” eﬀects which may arise out of the mobility of the tax base (Wilson, 1999) or
by “spillover eﬀects” either in local public good production or taxation (Besley and Coate,
2002, Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002). In our model, nobody moves, there are no spillover
2eﬀects on either the demand or the supply side of regions, there are no intergovernmental
transfers, and each local government ﬁnances its supply of local public good out of resident
taxation, so as to rule out tax competition eﬀects. The only source of diﬀerence we allow
between centralization and decentralization is that the central government internalizes
as components of social welfare the proﬁts that both ﬁrms make in both markets, while
under decentralization the local government is only interested to the proﬁts that are made
everywhere by its own resident ﬁrm (as they increase resident consumers’ income). This
captures in the simplest possible way the idea we discussed above that local interests may
have a larger weight on local governments’ welfare function.
In this setting, we ask what are the eﬀects of lobbying on economic outcomes and
social welfare in the two cases of decentralization and centralization. We consider two
forms of lobbying. In the ﬁrst one, ﬁrms lobby in the market; that is, ﬁrms have already
gained access to both markets and have an incentive to lobby politicians to increase local
public good production. In the second one, ﬁrms lobby for the market; that is, they lobby
politicians to gain access to local markets.
We get very sharp results. When lobbying is in the market, lobbying behavior under
centralization is always at least as bad for social welfare as under decentralization. Under
decentralization, when both ﬁrms lobby both local politicians, local public goods supply
is as distorted as under centralization (and so is social welfare), but lobbies pay higher
contributions and so are worse oﬀ. However, under decentralization there are also equi-
libria where each ﬁrm lobbies only one politician at the time, while this is not possible
under centralization. In this case, contributions are lower and so are the distortions in
social welfare. Contrary to common intuition, we show that in many cases it is the foreign
ﬁrm to lobby local politicians, rather than the home ﬁrm. The intuition here is simply
that foreign contributions have a larger weight for politicians than contributions from local
ﬁrms, as the latter contributions also reduce resident consumers’ welfare.
Results are reversed when lobbying is for the market. Under decentralization lobbying
always leads the local politicians to give access to the market to the resident ﬁrm only,
although a duopoly may be better for social welfare. No matter the degree of politicians’
benevolence, in fact, the local ﬁrm can always outbid the foreign ﬁrm to gain access to
the market, because only this ﬁrm’s proﬁts matter for the local politicians’ welfare. Under
centralization, on the contrary, this eﬀect is absent, which makes the central politician
more resilient to lobbying. Finally, we also show that when lobbying is for the market the
most eﬀective institutional structure against lobbying distortions may be an intermediate
one between centralization and decentralization. Under this structure, which we term
“split competencies”, decisions about the number of ﬁrms in each market are given to the
central government, while decisions about local public good supply are allocated to local
governments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the model. In
section 3 we examine the policy makers’ choices in the benchmark situation of no lobbying.
In section 4 we examine lobbying behavior when both ﬁrms compete and lobby in the
market. In section 5 we study lobbying for the market. Section 6 concludes. All proofs
and further technical details are in the appendix.
2T h e m o d e l
The economy is composed of two identical regions indexed by r ∈ {a,b}. There are four
goods: two private consumption goods, x and z, a production factor, y, and a public
3investment good, g. The latter is purely local, meaning that there is a distinct provision
in each region with no spillover eﬀects across regions. In each region live a continuum of
identical consumers with a mass of unity, not moving across regions, and there is a ﬁrm
producing good x, indexed by ρ ∈ {α,β},w h e r eα and β are the ﬁrms located in regions a
and b, respectively. In both regions consumers are endowed with a ﬁxed quantity ¯ y>0o f
the production factor and have identical preferences represented by the quasi-linear utility
function





We take good z to be the numeraire and its (national) market to be perfectly com-
petitive. Technology is linear and units are normalized so that the production of one unit
of z requires one unit of input y. These assumptions imply that in equilibrium proﬁts in
the production of good z are zero and that its supply is perfectly elastic. Moreover, the
market price of factor y is equal to one.
Firms α and β are entirely owned by consumers living in regions a and b, respectively,
and their proﬁts are entirely distributed to shareholders.1 Hence, consumers’ income
is composed of two terms: the market value of the ﬁxed endowment of good y,a n dt h e
distributed ﬁrms’ proﬁts, net of contributions to the politicians, if any. Consumer’s income
in region r is subject to a proportional income tax at rate tr, tr ∈ [0,1). We let pr be
the price of good x in region r, Πρr be the proﬁts (gross of contributions) earned by
ﬁrm ρ in region r,a n dsρr be the contributions to politicians by ﬁrm ρ for public good
gr. To simplify the presentation, and without loss of generality (given symmetry between
regions), in what follows we focus on region a.W ed e n o t ew i t hπα = Παa−sαa+Παb−sαb









s.t. paxa + za ≤ (1 − ta)(¯ y + πα),





From (2) it is apparent that for any given quantity xa > 0a ni n c r e a s ei nga increases
the marginal willingness to pay for good xa.
2.1 The markets for good x
In each region good x is traded in a local duopoly, with one of the ﬁrms located within the
region and the other one outside it. Firms maximize proﬁts and compete ` al aCournot.
Good y is the only input into production and technology is linear, so that marginal costs
are constant. There is however a source of asymmetry between ﬁrms. When a ﬁrm supplies
to its own regional market (at “home”), the production function is x = y/c (the marginal
cost is c>0), while when a ﬁrm supplies “abroad” the production function is x = y/(δc),
1Given quasi-linearity of the utility function, by which all income eﬀects fall on the demand of good z,
the equilibrium of the economy is independent of the distribution of proﬁts across consumers and across
regions.
4δ ≥ 1 (the marginal cost is δc), so that the home ﬁrm has a cost advantage over its
competitor.2
Denote with xρr the quantity sold by ﬁrm ρ in region r; hence aggregate sales in regions
a and b can be written as xa = xαa + xβa and xb = xαb + xβb. Using (2), ﬁrm α solves:
max
xαa,xαb
















Solving this problem and the symmetric one for ﬁrm β, we obtain the equilibrium
quantities
x∗
αa = hga,x ∗
βb = hgb,x ∗
βa = fga,x ∗
αb = fgb,
x∗
a =( h + f)ga,x ∗
b =( h + f)gb, (4)
and the equilibrium prices
p∗
a = p∗









To ensure that the quantities (and the respective prices) supplied by each ﬁrm in both
regions are non-negative, we impose the following restrictions on parameters:




This framework allows for a wide range of market structures. When δ =1 ,t h e n
h = f =( 1− c)/3, so that there is a symmetric duopoly in each region, since the “home”
ﬁrm has no cost advantage over its “foreign” rival. At the other extreme, when δ = δmax,
h =( 1− c)/2a n df = 0. The cost advantage of the “home” ﬁrm is so high that the
“foreign” ﬁrm does not enter the market, and thus there is a monopoly in each region. A
continuum of intermediate cases is obtained for δ ∈ (1,δmax).
Notice that the equilibrium gross proﬁts are linearly increasing in public good provision,
so that ﬁrms’ managers have an incentive to lobby the policy maker(s) for an expansion




αb = h2ga + f2gb, Π∗
β = Π∗
βa + Π∗
βb = f2ga + h2gb. (6)
2.2 The public sector
We consider two institutional settings. One is a centralized system, in which a single policy
maker chooses the supply of public goods in both regions. The other is a decentralized
one, in which each region is characterized by an independent policy maker choosing the
2For instance, the parameter δ (strictly speaking, δ − 1) can be interpreted as representing the extra
transportation costs needed to transfer one unit of good x across regions. We take the industrial structure
as given. In particular, we do not allow for a ﬁrm located in one region to open a new plant in the other
region so as to avoid paying the extra cost.
5local level of the public good. In both cases we assume public goods production to be
ﬁnanced with the residence-based income-tax. Technology for public good production
shows decreasing returns, with factor y used as the only input. The corresponding cost
function is assumed to be of the form φg2
r, φ > 0. In order to ease the notation, and
without any loss of generality, we let φ =1 /4.
Under a centralized system, a single decision maker chooses ga and gb and sets a







β +2¯ y), (7)
where π∗
ρ = Π∗
ρ − sρa − sρb.
Under a decentralized system, each regional policy maker independently and simulta-
neously chooses public good provision in her own region, and public expenditure is ﬁnanced










β +¯ y). (8)
Notice that by Walras’ law the markets for good z and factor y also clear.3
2.3 Social welfare
To compare the two alternative arrangements, we need a normative criteria. Let us
then deﬁne social welfare as the sum of consumers’ surplus, distributed proﬁts, and




a +( 1− ta)(¯ y + π∗
α), and π∗
α into the utility function of consumers (1), social







a +( 1− ta)(¯ y + Π∗
αa − sαa + Π∗
αb − sαb)+sαa + sβa,
which using (4), (6), and (8), can be rewritten as
Wa(ga,g b)=Wa(ga,g b) − sαb + sβa, (9)
where
Wa(ga,g b)=







3The supply of good z is perfectly elastic and thus its equilibrium quantity is determined by national
demand, z
d, from consumers. As for factor y, national supply from consumers is inelastic, y
s =2 ¯ y.T h e
demand for y comes from three sources: the public sector (y
d
PS), the ﬁrms producing good z (y
d
Z), and the
ﬁrms α and β (y
d
α+β). By Walras’ law, given that the centralized public sector’s budget constraint balances,




































βa). The same holds under decentralization.
4Alternatively, we could have deﬁned social welfare as the sum of consumer’s surplus and distributed
proﬁts, letting contributions enter the choice function of the government (see eq. 17 below) only as
a separate component. Our main results would remain valid under this alternative deﬁnition of social
welfare.
6National social welfare, W = Wa + Wb,i st h e n
W(ga,g b)=
(h + f)2 +2 ( h2 + f2)
2






Comparing these equations, we notice an important diﬀerence. The net eﬀect of lobbyists’
contributions on national social welfare is nil, since they are a pure transfer from lobbyists
to politicians. Hence, a fully benevolent social planner under centralization should not
take them into account. However, this is not true under decentralization. In this case, a
contribution of ﬁrm α to the policy maker of region b counts as a welfare loss in region a,
whereas a contribution of ﬁrm β to the policy maker of region a counts as a welfare gain
in region a. Hence, under decentralization, increasing the contributions from foreign ﬁrms
to home politicians and reducing own ﬁrms contributions to foreign politicians count as a
net increase in social welfare and as such should be considered by a benevolent planner.
3 Optimal public good provision without lobbying
Let us begin our analysis by examining policy choices in the benchmark case of no lobbying.
Under centralization, the benevolent social planner would choose public goods supply by
maximizing (11), giving for both ga and gb:
ˆ gC =( h + f)2 +2 ( h2 + f2). (12)
Under decentralization, on the other hand, the policy maker of region a would maximize
(10) with respect to ga,t a k i n ggb as given (and an analogous problem is solved by the
policy maker in region b), obtaining the symmetric solution
ˆ gD =( h + f)2 +2 h2. (13)
By using (6), (12) and (13), equilibrium proﬁts of each ﬁrm under centralization and
decentralization are:
ˆ πC =( h2 + f2)ˆ gC, (14)
ˆ πD =( h2 + f2)ˆ gD. (15)
It follows:
Proposition 1 Suppose there is no lobbying. Then if δ ∈ [1,δmax) public good supply,
national social welfare and ﬁrms’ proﬁts are higher under centralization than under decen-
tralization. In the limiting case δ = δmax, the two regimes are equivalent.
Proof. The part on public good supply and ﬁrms’ proﬁts follows from f2 > 0i f
δ ∈ [1,δmax)a n df2 =0i fδ = δmax, and by comparison of (12)—(13) and of (14)—(15),
respectively. As for aggregate social welfare, since ga = gb =ˆ gC is a global maximum of
(11), the latter is not maximized for ga = gb =ˆ gD < ˆ gC.
The intuition is simple. When a regional policy maker considers an increase in local
public good supply, she does not internalize as social welfare gains the additional proﬁts
made by the non-resident ﬁrm. Hence, when both ﬁrms sell in both regions, local public
good supply is lower under decentralization and so are proﬁts and national welfare. On the
contrary, a centralized policy maker internalizes the entire ﬁrms’ proﬁt gains, and hence
she has a greater incentive to expand public good supply. These incentives are the same
when the resident ﬁrm is a monopoly within its own region, and hence ˆ gC =ˆ gD.
74 Lobbying in the market
We now consider the eﬀect of introducing lobbying into the model. We consider two
diﬀerent cases, lobbying in the market and lobbying for the market. In the ﬁrst case, ﬁrms
are already present in the market and have an incentive to lobby politicians to increase
public good supply, as this increases their proﬁts. In the second case, ﬁrms compete
to acquire the right to produce in the market. In both cases, we derive equilibrium
contributions and social welfare in the two cases of centralization and decentralization
and compare the results.
In this section, we analyze the case of lobbying in the market. In this framework,
we study lobbying behavior using the common agency approach developed by Bernheim
and Whinston (1986) and popularized by Dixit et al. (1997). Notice however that under
decentralization, as there are two principals (ﬁrms α and β) lobbying two agents (policy
makers a and b), our model combines elements of both the common agency model and the
one-principal many-agents model (on the latter, see for instance Mookherjee, 1984, and
Ma, 1988). We examine ﬁrst the case of a centralized system.
4.1 Centralization
A lobby maximizes proﬁts net of contributions to the policy maker, who in turn maximizes
a weighted average of social welfare and lobbyists’ contributions. As for the timing, we
assume that ﬁrms move ﬁrst, by independently and simultaneously oﬀering the policy
maker a contribution schedule deﬁning its monetary contribution as a function of public
good provision. Second, upon acceptance of the lobbies contributions, the policy maker
chooses public goods supply.
Following Dixit et al. (1997), we focus on truthful equilibria, in which each lobby
oﬀers the policy maker a non-negative compensating contribution schedule, shaped along
its iso-proﬁtc u r v e .F i r mρ’s compensating contribution schedule is deﬁned as
Sρ(ga,g b,πρ)=m a x
©
h2gr + f2g−r − πρ,0
ª
. (16)
Using (11) and (16), the policy maker’s objective function is
V C(ga,g b,πα,πβ)=µW +( 1− µ)(Sα + Sβ). (17)
The parameter µ,0<µ≤ 1, captures the degree of “benevolence” of the policy maker.
We rule out the unrealistic case that the politician cares about contributions only, i.e. we
assume µ 6=0 .
By solving the lobbying game through the maximization of (17), the optimal public
good supply, both for ga and gb,i s 5






5We refer the reader to Appendix A for all the analytical details. Notice that throughout the paper
a “hat” denotes the solutions obtained without lobbying, whereas a “tilde” denotes the corresponding
solutions under lobbying for public good provision.
8Unsurprisingly, lobbying induces an upward distortion in public good supply, and hence a
welfare loss, unless the policy maker is fully benevolent (µ =1 ) .
Equilibrium net proﬁts and contributions are
˜ πC =ˆ πC + m(h4 + f4 +4 h2f2), (20)
˜ sC = m(h4 + f4). (21)
Eq. (20) shows that proﬁts under lobbying are equal to proﬁts without it, ˆ πC,p l u sa
proﬁt gain from lobbying. As expected, if the policy maker does not care about lobbyists’
contributions, ˜ πC =ˆ πC and ˜ sC =0 ,s i n c em =0 .
The lobbying game in which both ﬁrms lobby for both public goods is not the only one
conceivable. In fact, each ﬁrm has four options – lobby for both public goods, lobby for
one public good only (either the one produced in its own region or the one produced in the
other region), and no lobby. However, we do not need to examine all the corresponding
lobbying games, since each ﬁrm’s proﬁts are larger if it lobbies for both public goods,
no matter what the other ﬁrm does. This follows directly from the deﬁnition of truthful
strategy and the associated compensating contribution function. From proposition 2 in
Dixit et al. (1997), a truthful strategy is weakly dominant, and in our setting truthful
strategies always involve non-negative contributions by both ﬁr m so nb o t hp u b l i cg o o d s .
4.2 Decentralization
Under decentralization, each ﬁrm has four possible strategies: lobby both regions (B),
lobby only “at home” – inside its region (I), lobby only “abroad” – outside its region
(O), and, ﬁnally, no lobby (N). This strategy set gives rise to a 4 × 4 normal form
symmetric game – that we denote as the where-to-lobby game – whose payoﬀsa r et h e
ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts at the corresponding truthful equilibrium of the lobbying-game.
By symmetry between ﬁrms, it is suﬃcient to consider 9 diﬀerent lobby games only to
construct the where-to-lobby game (in addition to the no-lobby case already examined in
section 3). In the following we focus on those lobbying games in which ﬁrms play the same
strategy, referring the reader to Appendix A for all remaining cases.
Let Sρr(gr,πρr) be the compensating contribution schedule that ﬁrm ρ oﬀers the policy

















.W h e nb o t hﬁrms lobby both regions
(BB), policy makers maximize6
V DBB
a = µ(Wa − Sαb + Sβa)+( 1− µ)(Sαa + Sβa), (22)
V DBB
b = µ(Wb − Sβa + Sαb)+( 1− µ)(Sβb + Sαb). (23)
As already noted above, under decentralization, diﬀerent lobbies’ contributions do not
have the same weight into the local politicians’ preferences. One unit of contribution a
ﬁrm makes abroad counts as −µ in the home region but as 1 in the recipient region, while
one unit of contribution a ﬁrm makes at home counts as 1 − µ i nt h eh o m er e g i o na n d
nothing abroad.
6We assume that the degree of benevolence of regional policy makers is the same as that of the central
policy maker.
9The optimal public good supply in each region is (see Appendix A for details)
˜ gDBB =ˆ gD +2 f2 +2 m(h2 + f2), (24)
and total (home plus abroad) net proﬁts of each ﬁrm are
˜ πDBB =ˆ πD + mh4 +2 ( 1+2 m)h2f2 +( m − m−1)f4. (25)
In a decentralized system lobbies are able to inﬂuence public policy even when the social
planner is fully benevolent (µ = 1). In fact, even if the regional policy maker does not
place any value on contributions per se, contributions oﬀered by the foreign ﬁrm enter the
region social welfare and hence inﬂuence her choices, as represented by the second term
in (24).
T u r n i n gt ot h ec a s ei nw h i c hb o t hﬁrms lobby their home region only (II), the policy
makers’ objective functions become
V DII
a = µWa +( 1− µ)Sαa, (26)
V DII
b = µWb +( 1− µ)Sβb, (27)
and, as it is shown in Appendix A, public good supply and total net proﬁts are, respectively,
˜ gDII =ˆ gD +2 mh2, (28)
˜ πDII =ˆ πD + mh4 +2 mh2f2. (29)
Finally, when both ﬁrms lobby only abroad (OO), policy makers maximize
V DOO
a = µ(Wa − Sαb + Sβa)+( 1− µ)Sβa, (30)
V DOO
b = µ(Wb − Sβa + Sαb)+( 1− µ)Sαb, (31)
obtaining
˜ gDOO =ˆ gD +2 ( 1+m)f2, (32)
and thus total net proﬁts are
˜ πDOO =ˆ πD +2 ( 1+m)h2f2 +( 1+m)f4. (33)
Using (25), (29) and (33), as well as the other expressions for equilibrium proﬁts in
Table 3, Appendix A, the resulting where-to-lobby game is shown in Table 1. Each cell
contains the payoﬀ of the row player, ﬁrm α, at the top, and that of the column player,
ﬁrm β, at the bottom. The proﬁt gains from lobbying of the ﬁrm playing strategy i when
the opponent is playing j,w i t hi,j ∈ {B,I,O,N} are denoted with ∆πij =˜ πDij − ˆ πD.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the equilibria of the where-to-lobby game depend on the
parameter µ, representing politicians’ preferences for contributions, and on the diﬀerential-
cost parameter δ,w h i c hi n ﬂuences market structure. The thick curves divide the closed set
S =( µ,δ) ∈ [0,1]×[1,δmax] into three subsets,7 one in which the unique Nash equilibrium
of the where-to-lobby game is BB,o n ei nw h i c hi ti sII,a n dﬁnally one in which it is
OO. Firms lobby both policy makers only if the latter are “greedy” enough, assigning at
least as much weight to contributions as to social welfare (i.e. µ ≤ 1
2). On the other hand,
if politicians care more about social welfare than contributions, ﬁrms lobby at most one
politician. Whether it is the home one (equilibrium II) or the outside one (equilibrium
OO), it depends on the values of δ and µ. Proposition 2 makes this argument precise.
7The meaning of the curves µ
E(δ;c)a n dµ
S(δ;c), will become apparent in Corollary 1 and Proposition
3, respectively.
10Table 1: The where-to-lobby game under decentralization
ﬁrm β
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Figure 1: Lobbying equilibria under decentralization
Proposition 2 For δ ∈ [1,˜ δ] the unique Nash equilibrium of the where-to-lobby game
under decentralization is BB if and only if µ ∈ (0,µ BO] and OO otherwise. For δ ∈































Proof. See Appendix A.
While under centralization ﬁrms always lobby for both public goods, Proposition 2
shows that under decentralization this result does not emerge if politicians are benevolent
enough (i.e. µ>1
2). The intuition is that when a ﬁrm lobbies abroad, the contribution
paid to the politician counts as a welfare loss at home. Hence, in order to successfully lobby
at home as well, the ﬁrm has to pay a “double” bribe: one to compensate for the welfare
loss of lobbying abroad, and one to compensate for the resulting public good distortion at
home. Double lobbying turns out to be proﬁtable only if µ<1
2, since it is not necessary,
coeteris paribus, to pay high contributions to successfully lobby greedy politicians. On the
contrary, when ﬁrms face politicians who are benevolent enough, it becomes too costly to
compensate the home politician for the negative externality caused by lobbying abroad,
and hence it becomes proﬁtable to lobby at most in one region.8 When this is the case,
8This intuition is evident from the equilibrium contributions shown in Table 4. A ﬁrm, say α,l o b b y i n g
both regions pays a contribution ˜ s
DBB
αb =( 1 + m)f
4 to the abroad politician. The contribution paid at home,
˜ s
DBB
αa , is made up of two terms: (1+m
−1)f
4 as a compensation for the welfare loss for paying contributions
abroad, and mh




which occurs if µ>
1
2, it does not pay to lobby both regions.
12whether the equilibrium is II or OO hinges upon two contrasting eﬀects. On the one
hand, since the weight assigned by the politician to contributions from the home ﬁrms is
lower than the one assigned to contributions from abroad (1−µ and 1, respectively), ﬁrms
have an advantage in lobbying abroad. On the other hand, since a ﬁrm is more productive
at home, i.e. h ≥ f,i tm a k e sm o r ep r o ﬁts when lobbying at home. These two contrasting
eﬀects – i.e. the fact that the comparative advantage of lobbying abroad is increasing
in µ w h e r e a st h a to fl o b b y i n ga th o m ei si n c r e a s i n gi nδ – explain why the boundary
between the equilibria OO and II is given by the increasing function µIO(δ;c).
It is also worth noting that the equilibria of the where-to-lobby game are not always
Pareto eﬃcient in terms of aggregate ﬁrms’ net proﬁts. As Corollary 1 shows, when the
equilibrium is either BB or OO aggregate ﬁrms’ proﬁts are maximized. On the contrary,
when the equilibrium is II ﬁr m sm a ye n du pi nap r i s o n e rd i l e m m a ,i nw h i c ht h e yb o t h
lobby at home while lobbying abroad would be more proﬁtable. As shown in Figure 1, the
boundary between the eﬃcient Nash equilibria II and the ineﬃcient ones is given by the
curve µE(δ;c), with the former equilibria lying below the curve.
Corollary 1 The Nash equilibria BB and OO of the where-to-lobby game are Pareto
eﬃcient in terms of aggregate ﬁrms’ net proﬁts. The equilibrium II is Pareto eﬃcient if







,w h e r eµE(δ;c)=
h4−f4
h4+2h2f2.O t h e r w i s e
II is Pareto dominated by the strategy pair OO.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4.3 A comparison
The above results allow for a comparison of lobbying behavior under centralization and
decentralization along various dimensions: social welfare and public good supply, ﬁrms’
net proﬁts, and contributions to politicians. From Proposition 1 we know that in a world
without lobbying aggregate social welfare is higher under centralization than under de-
centralization, since under the latter regime regional policy makers do not internalize as
social welfare the proﬁts of the foreign ﬁrm and hence undersupply public goods.
This result is reversed when lobbies inﬂuence the policy making process. In a central-
ized system, since both ﬁrms lobby for both public goods and the policy maker internalizes
all spillover eﬀects on proﬁts, the resulting upward distortion in public good supply reduces
social welfare. When the equilibrium is BB the same distortion, however, occurs under
decentralization too, as the supply of public goods is the same under decentralization and
centralization. The joint lobbying eﬀort exerted by ﬁrms on both regional policy mak-
ers induces the latter to implicitly account for the regional proﬁt-spillovers via in public
good supply. However, when politicians are benevolent enough and ﬁrms lobby at most
one policy maker (i.e. when the equilibrium is either II or OO)l o b b y i n gi sl e s se ﬀective
and the distortion in public good supply and the associated welfare loss are lower under
decentralization than under centralization. Moreover, lobbies always prefer a centralized
system over a decentralized one, since net proﬁts are higher. This is obvious if the decen-
tralized equilibrium is BB, since gross proﬁts are the same under the two regimes whereas
contributions are higher under decentralization than under centralization. Firms are also
clearly better oﬀ under centralization whenever the equilibrium under decentralization is
either II or OO, since in the latter case gross proﬁts are lower while contributions, though
smaller in some cases, do not allow higher net proﬁts compared to centralization.
The following proposition summarizes these results.
13Proposition 3 I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fl o b b y i n g ,ﬁrms’ net proﬁts are higher under centraliza-
tion than under decentralization. Contributions to politicians are higher under decentral-
ization when the equilibrium is BB and, provided that µ>µ S(δ;c)= h4
h4+f4,a l s ow h e nt h e
equilibrium is OO; otherwise contributions are higher under centralization. Public good
supply and aggregate social welfare are the same under the two regimes when the equi-
librium under decentralization is BB. When the equilibrium is either II or OO,p u b l i c
good supply is lower, whereas aggregate social welfare is higher, under decentralization than
under centralization.
Proof. See Appendix A.
5 Lobbying for the market
We consider now a diﬀerent political economy framework, one in which ﬁrms lobby for
acquiring the right to enter the market instead of lobbying for public goods provision. We
assume the following time line. In stage 1, the government (central or regional, depending
on the case) decides on the number of ﬁrms that are allowed to operate in the market for
good x.I fb o t hﬁrms are allowed to enter, ﬁrms have no incentive to pay the politician in
stage 2 since we do not allow in this section for lobbying in the market ex post for public
good provision (hence the game goes directly to stage 4). Conversely, if the government
allows for one entrant only in stage 1, in stage 2 ﬁrms competing for the market make
a credible commitment to pay politicians a contribution if they are given the monopoly
right in the market for good x. In stage 3, the politician, knowing the oﬀer made by
the ﬁrms in stage 2, assigns the monopoly right to the ﬁrm that guarantees her the
highest payoﬀ (weighted average of social welfare and lobbies’ contributions) and cashes
the contribution. In stage 4, the government chooses public good supply by maximizing
social welfare. Finally, in stage 5 market equilibrium is determined along the lines of
section 2. The model is solved by backward induction.
The more complex structure of this case allows us to consider three diﬀerent institu-
tional settings. In the ﬁrst one, the central government chooses both the number of ﬁrms
entering each regional market and local public good supplies (full centralization). In the
second one, the central government establishes the number of ﬁrms that are allowed to
operate in each regional market but regional public good supply is decided at the regional
level (split competencies). Finally, in the third case, each regional government chooses
both the number of ﬁrms entering its market and public good supply (full decentraliza-
tion). The case of split competencies captures the well known fact that in most countries
regional and central competencies often overlap (e.g. competition policies), rather than
being neatly assigned to one of the two levels of governments. Thus, this allows us to ask
if the presence of lobbying may provide a rationale for these arrangements.
To investigate these three cases, we need to compute ﬁrst market equilibrium and
welfare under monopoly (stage 5), thus integrating the duopoly analysis already provided








by standard proﬁt maximization, when the regional markets are monopolized the equi-
librium quantities are x∗
a = Hga and x∗
b = Hgb (x∗
a = Fga and x∗
b = Fgb)i fi ti st h e
home (foreign) ﬁrm that supplies the market. The corresponding equilibrium proﬁts are
14Π∗
α = H2ga and Π∗
β = H2gb (Π∗
α = F2gb and Π∗
β = F2ga) when the home (foreign) ﬁrm
supplies the market.






































where the apix HaHb (resp. FaFb) denotes that home (resp. foreign) ﬁrms are monopolists
in both regions, and HaFb (resp. FaHb)t h a tﬁrm α (resp. β) is a monopolist in both
regions. We begin the analysis with the full centralization case.
5.1 Full centralization
By symmetry, we only consider the case in which the central government opts in stage 1
for the same policy, one or two ﬁrms, in both regions. Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n t
allows for both ﬁrms supplying both regional markets. This case has already been studied
in section 3, where policy without lobbying was described. Substituting the optimal public
good provision given in (12) into (11), the politician’s value function when both ﬁrms are
allowed to enter the market is then
ˆ V hf = µ
[(h + f)2 +2 ( h2 + f2)]2
2
+2 µ¯ y. (42)
Consider next the case in which only one ﬁrm is allowed to enter the regional markets.
The government holds simultaneously an auction for each market, and ﬁrms have now
an incentive to compete for it, making contributions to the government. Let SH
ρ and
SF
ρ be the contribution oﬀered by ﬁrm ρ for serving the home and the foreign market,
respectively. The following Lemma summarizes the outcome of ﬁrms’ competition for the
market.
Lemma 1 Under full centralization, if only one ﬁrm is allowed to enter the regional
markets, then each ﬁrm gets the home market by paying the contribution
ˆ SH








The corresponding politician’s value function is
ˆ V H = µ
9H4
2
+2 ( 1− µ)ˆ SH
ρ +2 µ¯ y. (44)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition is simple. A local monopoly is always more proﬁtable than a foreign one,
since by assumption the home ﬁrm has a cost advantage over the foreign one (H ≥ F)a n d














































(a) Full centralization versus
Split competencies
(b)
Figure 2: Lobbying for the market
each ﬁrm wins the home market by outbidding the foreign ﬁrm, whose oﬀer ˆ SF
ρ at most
equals the proﬁts it would make by serving the foreign market in a monopolistic regime,
3F4. Notice however from (43) that the home ﬁrm does not need to oﬀer that much, and
in some cases it does not even need to make a positive oﬀer to win the market. The reason
is that if the foreign ﬁrm gets the market, then a welfare loss is observed compared to a
home-monopoly. Thus, in order to win the market, the home ﬁrm can always oﬀer the
politician a lower contribution than the one oﬀered by the foreign ﬁrm. Quite intuitively,
the higher are µ and δ the more likely is that the home ﬁrm does not need to make a
positive oﬀer to win the market.
By comparing (42) and (44), we can ﬁnally characterize the central government’s choice
in stage 1.
Proposition 4 Under full centralization, for δ ∈ [1,δ1], δ1(c)=5+17c
22c ,t h e r ee x i s t sa
µ1(δ;c),d e c r e a s i n gi nδ, such that for all µ ≤ µ1 only one ﬁrm is allowed to enter each
regional market; by Lemma 1, the home ﬁrm obtains a monopoly upon the payment of a
contribution. For δ ∈ [1,δ1] and µ>µ 1 both ﬁrms are allowed into both regional markets.
For δ ∈ (δ1,δmax] only one ﬁrm is allowed to enter each regional market for all µ and
therefore the home ﬁrm gets a monopoly. As for contributions, there exists a µ2(δ;c),
decreasing in δ, such that the ﬁrm pays a contribution for all µ<µ 2 a n dn oc o n t r i b u t i o n
otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The results in Proposition 4 are illustrated in Figure 2-a. For δ ≤ δ1 and µ>µ 1 the
policy maker opts for a duopoly in both markets (hfahfb). In all other cases she opts for
a monopoly and, given the results in Lemma 1, each ﬁrm wins its home market (HaHb).
In this latter case, positive contributions (ˆ SH
ρ > 0) are paid if and only if µ is below a
given threshold (µ1 or µ2, depending on the value of δ); otherwise the home ﬁrm does not
need to oﬀer a contribution to gain access to the monopolized market.
To understand the intuition behind these results, suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h ep o l i t i c i a n
simply maximizes social welfare (i.e. µ = 1). The proposition then shows that there exists
a threshold level of the cost advantage for the home ﬁrm, δ1, such that for δ < δ1 (δ ≥ δ1),
social welfare is higher (lower) under a duopoly than under a monopoly. Hence, the fully
benevolent politician simply lets both ﬁrms enter both markets in the former case and
16only the home ﬁrm in the latter one. If instead µ<1, the politician faces a trade-oﬀ when
δ < δ1. By creating a monopoly, she gets a contribution from the home ﬁrm winning
the contest for the market, but at the cost of the monopoly welfare loss; however, if she
lets both ﬁrms in, she avoids this welfare cost but does not get any contributions (recall
there is no lobbying in the market here). This explains why, for δ < δ1,as u ﬃciently
benevolent policy maker – one with preferences µ>µ 1 – makes the eﬃcient choice,
while a politician who is greedier (µ ≤ µ1) prefers a monopoly by home ﬁrms in each
regional market. This trade oﬀ is absent when δ ≥ δ1, since social welfare is however
higher under a home monopoly than under a duopoly. Hence the politician always allows
only one ﬁrm in each market, no matter her degree of benevolence. The latter only bears
on whether contributions are paid to the central politician. If µ>µ 2, i.e. if the politician
is suﬃciently benevolent, then home ﬁr m sw o u l dn o tn e e dt ob r i b et h ep o l i t i c i a ni no r d e r
to win the local monopoly, even though foreign ﬁrms made a positive oﬀer. Instead, if the
politician is greedy (µ ≤ µ2), the home ﬁrm must oﬀer a contribution to outbid the oﬀer
made by the foreign ﬁrm. Recalling that lobbies’ contributions are pure transfers and that
when lobbying is for the market there are no distortions in public goods supply, we can
conclude that a loss in social welfare occurs if and only if lobbying induces the central
government to opt for local monopolies whenever a benevolent social planner would have
opted for local duopolies. Formally:
Corollary 2 Under full centralization lobbying causes a welfare loss iﬀ δ ∈ [1,δ1) and
µ ∈ (0,µ 1).
5.2 Split competencies
Consider next the case in which the central government chooses how many ﬁrms enter each
market, but the regional governments choose public good supply. Since what diﬀerentiates
split competencies and the fully centralized regimes is only the equilibrium level of public
goods supply, we can directly follow the above logic to prove:9
Proposition 5 Under split competencies, for δ ∈ [1,δ2], δ2(c) < δ1(c) for all c ∈ (0,1),
there exists a µ3(δ;c) such that for all µ ≤ µ3 only one ﬁrm is allowed to enter each
regional market, and therefore the home ﬁrm obtains a monopoly upon the payment of a
contribution; otherwise both ﬁrms are allowed into both regional markets. For δ ∈ (δ2,δmax]
only one ﬁrm is allowed to enter each regional market for all µ, and hence the home ﬁrm
gets a monopoly. As for contributions, there exists a µ4(δ;c) such that the ﬁrm pays a
contribution for all µ<µ 4 and no contribution otherwise.
Split competencies and full centralization are compared in Figure 2-b. Notice that the
area in which each ﬁrm obtains a monopoly at home upon the payment of a contribution
is certainly smaller under split competencies, since the curves µ3 and µ4 for the latter
case lie below the respective curves µ1 and µ2 for centralization. Hence, lobbying for the
market is less eﬀective under split competencies than under centralization.
However, the comparison in terms of social welfare depends on parameters. As δ2 < δ1,
there is an area under split competencies – deﬁned by δ ∈ (δ2,δ1)a n dµ>µ 1 –i nw h i c h
even a fully benevolent central politician (µ = 1) would opt for a monopoly by the home
ﬁrm instead of the more eﬃcient duopoly. This is so because under split competencies
9The formal proof is available from the authors upon request.
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Table 2: Politicians’ value functions under full decentralization
public good provision is decided at the local level and as shown above (in section 3)
local public goods are underprovided by local governments in local duopolies (since local
governments do not count proﬁts from foreign ﬁr m sa ss o c i a lw e l f a r e ) . H e n c e ,a l l o w i n g
for a single home producer by the center is a way to partly counteract this ineﬃciency at
local level. On the other hand, split competencies is more eﬃcient than centralization for
δ < δ2 , as the set in which two ﬁrms are allowed in both markets (the eﬃcient choice)
is larger under split competencies than under centralization, since µ3 <µ 1. This is again
due to the fact that local governments do not consider foreign ﬁrms’ proﬁts as part of
the (local) social welfare. In fact, in the event of a foreign monopoly, a local government
undersupplies the public good compared to a central government. This means that, under
split competencies, in order to outbid the foreign competitor home ﬁrms need to oﬀer the
politician a smaller contribution, which explains why lobbying is more eﬀective under full
centralization.
5.3 Full decentralization
We ﬁnally consider the case of full decentralization, in which regional governments (si-
multaneously) choose ﬁrst the number of ﬁrms that are allowed to enter their market,
and then public good supply. The choice on the number of ﬁrms gives rise to a 2 × 2
normal form game between regional policy makers. Whenever only one ﬁrm is allowed to
supply a regional market ﬁrms compete to gain access to it by bribing the regional policy
maker. For any strategy pair, Lemma 2 establishes the outcome of ﬁrms’ competition for
the market and regional payoﬀs, shown in Table 2, in terms of the maximum value of
politicians’ objective functions.10
Lemma 2 Under full decentralization, whenever a region allows only for one ﬁrm to
serve its local market, then it is the home ﬁrm to gain access to the market, paying the
contribution
ˆ SH












Depending on the number of ﬁrms allowed into each regional markets, politicians’ value
functions are those shown in Table 2.
10Since the game is symmetric, the Table shows only the payoﬀso fr e g i o na’s politician. Also, to save
space, regional social welfare is net of the endowment ¯ y.
18Proof. See Appendix B.
The reasons why, under decentralization, it is always the home ﬁrm to gain a monopoly
in its market when competing with the foreign ﬁrm, are the same already discussed for
the other two regimes. From (45) it is immediate to see that ˆ SH
ρ > 0 if and only if
µ<µ 5(δ;c)=
4F4
9H4 − F4. (46)
Regional politicians choose the number of ﬁrms in the market by playing the normal
form game given in Table 2. The solution of such a policy game is given in the following
proposition:
Proposition 6 Under full decentralization, it is a dominant strategy for both regional
policy makers to admit only one ﬁrm in their market for all µ ∈ (0,1] and δ ∈ [1,δmax].
Hence, by Lemma 2 the home ﬁrm gets a local monopoly upon the payment of a positive
contribution for µ<µ 5(δ;c) and nothing otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 6 shows that lobbying for the market is most eﬀective under full decen-
tralization, with the home ﬁrms always gaining a local monopoly in their regional market.
When δ < δ1, although a duopoly would be the eﬃcient solution in both regions, markets
turn out to be fully monopolized no matter the value of µ. This means that in the case
of lobbying for the market full decentralization is the less eﬃcient of the three regimes.
Moreover, one can show that the Nash equilibrium (one-ﬁrm, one-ﬁr m )o ft h eg a m ei n
Table 2 is also Pareto ineﬃcient in terms of politicians’ aggregate value functions for all
δ < δ2. What makes the diﬀerence between full decentralization and split competencies
is thus that, while under the former regime regional policy makers end up in a prisoner
dilemma, under the latter regime this outcome does not occur, because it is the central
policy maker that directly chooses the highest aggregate payoﬀ along the diagonal cells of
the game in Table 2.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We began this work by recalling Prud’homme’s argument against the dangers of decen-
tralization due to lobbying eﬀects by local interests. Our analysis made it clear when this
argument is correct and when it is not. If ﬁrms lobby for the market, then decentral-
ization is certainly a bad idea. Local governments have a strong incentive to allow only
home ﬁrms to enter in the market, as their proﬁts only matter for local welfare, which in
turn means that a local ﬁr mc a na l w a y se a s i l yo u t b i daf o r e i g no n e .I fﬁrms lobby in the
market, on the other hand, lobbying may not be as dangerous under decentralization as it
is under centralization. Local governments do not internalize the spillover eﬀects induced
by foreign ﬁrms’ proﬁts, and while this may be a source of ineﬃciency for local public
goods provision, it has the eﬀect of making local governments more resilient to lobbies’
contributions. This suggests that the best institutional structure as lobbying is concerned
is one in which competencies across diﬀerent levels of government are split, with central
government taking care of decisions about the number of ﬁrms allowed to operate in the
markets and local governments deciding on local public good production.
Our analysis could be extended in several directions. On the one hand, to better focus
on the issue at hand, we abstracted from several realistic features of existing federations,
19such as intergovernmental transfers and ﬁrms mobility. Introducing these features may
provide a more complete picture of the relationships between decentralization and lobby-
ing. On the other hand, the political side of the model could be expanded, for instance by
introducing campaign contributions to political parties and elections, as well as bargaining
in legislatures. Allowing for a more complex institutional structure (along the lines, for
example, of Persson and Tabellini, 2000, ch. 7, Mitra, 1999, Besley and Coate, 2001, Felli
and Merlo, 2001) may highlight other channels of interaction between local interests and
local policies.
A Appendix: Lobbying for public good provision
The lobbying-games are solved by extending the logic in proposition 3 in Dixit et al. (1997).
A.1 Centralization




+( 1− µ)(h2 + f2)=0 , (47)
we obtain ˜ gC in (18) for both ga and gb.I nd e r i v i n gt h eﬁrst order condition (47), we ignore the
non-negativity constraint on contributions, by letting Sρ = h2gr + f2g−r − πρ into the objective
function, and then checking non-negativity ex post in the computed equilibrium. To compute the
equilibrium proﬁts of ﬁrm β we need ﬁrst to solve the problem in which ﬁrm α is lobbying and
ﬁrm β is not lobbying. Hence, the policy maker maximizes V C
−β = µW +( 1− µ)Sα.F r o m t h e




+( 1− µ)h2 =0 ,µ
∂W
∂gb
+( 1− µ)f2 =0 ,
we obtain the optimal public good supplies:
˜ gC
a(−β) =ˆ gC +2 mh2, ˜ gC
b(−β) =ˆ gC +2 mf2.
Writing the equation V C ¡
˜ gC










and solving for πβ,w eo b t a i n
the equilibrium proﬁts ˜ πC
β s h o w ni n( 2 0 ) .B ys y m m e t r y ,˜ πC
α =˜ πC
β . Finally, by substituting (18)
and (20) into (16), we check that equilibrium contributions in (21) are non-negative.
A.2 Decentralization: derivation of the where-to-lobby game
We solve the lobby game for each strategy pair occurring under decentralization, ignoring the
non-negativity constraint on contributions, letting Sαa = h2ga − παa, Sβa = f2ga − πβa, Sαb =
f2gb−παb and Sβb = h2gb−πβb.W ec h e c kex post that equilibrium contributions are non-negative.
V Dij
r denotes the preferences of policy maker r when ﬁrms α and β are choosing action i and j,
respectively, i,j ∈ {B,I,O,N}. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 3 (equilibrium
proﬁts) and Table 4 (equilibrium contributions).
Both ﬁrms lobbying both regions (BB)
When both ﬁrms lobby both regions, the policy makers’ objective functions are (22) and (23)
in the text. By maximizing (22) with respect to ga and (23) with respect to gb,w eo b t a i nt h e
symmetric solution ˜ gDBB in (24). To compute the equilibrium proﬁts, assume that ﬁrm α lobbies
both regions (B)a n dﬁrm β does not lobby (N). Policy makers maximize:
V DBN
a = µ(Wa − Sαb)+( 1− µ)Sαa, (48)
V DBN
b = µ(Wb + Sαb)+( 1− µ)Sαb. (49)
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Table 3: Firms’ net proﬁts under decentralization
Contributions at home Contributions abroad
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ﬁrm β N – –
˜ s
Dij
ρr denotes the equilibrium contribution made by ﬁrm ρ in region r when
ﬁrm α plays strategy i and ﬁrm β plays strategy j,w h e r ei,j ∈ {B,I,O,N}.
Table 4: Firms’ contributions under decentralization
21Optimal public goods supplies are:
˜ gDBN
a =ˆ gD +2 mh2, (50)
˜ gDBN
































for πβa and πβb, we get the equilibrium proﬁts shown in Table 3. The reservation utility of the
policy maker in region a, i.e. the r.h.s. of eq. (52), is deﬁned by assuming that ﬁrm β does
not lobby region a (ga =˜ gDBN
a ) while lobbying region b (gb =˜ gDBB
b ). By the same token, the
reservation utility of the policy maker in region b, i.e. the r.h.s. of eq. (53), is deﬁned by assuming
that ﬁrm β does not lobby region b (gb =˜ gDBN
b ) while lobbying region a (ga =˜ gDBB
a ). The same
kind of logic is used below when solving the games BI, BO and BN,i nw h i c ho n eo ft h eﬁrms is
lobbying both policy makers. Finally, equilibrium contributions of the game BB,s h o w ni nT a b l e
4, are obtained from substitution of optimal public good supplies and proﬁts into the contribution
functions, i.e. from ˜ sDBB
βa = f2˜ gDBB − ˜ πDBB
βa and ˜ sDBB
βb = h2˜ gDBB − ˜ πDBB
βb .
One ﬁrm lobbying both regions and one lobbying the home region only (BI)
Suppose that ﬁrm α chooses B and ﬁrm β chooses I. Policy makers maximize:
V DBI
a = µ(Wa − Sαb)+( 1− µ)Sαa, (54)
V DBI
b = µ(Wb + Sαb)+( 1− µ)(Sαb + Sβb), (55)
from which:
˜ gDBI
a =ˆ gD +2 mh2, (56)
˜ gDBI
b =ˆ gD +2 f2 +2 m(h2 + f2). (57)
Assume now that ﬁrm α does not lobby. Policy makers maximize:
V DNI
a = µWa, (58)
V DNI
b = µWb +( 1− µ)Sβb, (59)
and optimal public goods supplies are:
˜ gDNI
a =ˆ gD, (60)
˜ gDNI
































for παa and παb we get the equilibrium proﬁts that a ﬁrm lobbying both regions makes at home and
abroad when the other ﬁrm is lobbying only at home (see Table 3). To compute the equilibrium
proﬁts of ﬁrm β,a s s u m en o wt h a tα chooses B while β chooses N. Policy makers maximize (48)
















for πβb we get the equilibrium proﬁts that a ﬁrm makes at home when lobbying only at home while
the other ﬁrm is lobbying both regions (see Table 3). Finally, equilibrium contributions for the
game BI (see Table 4) are computed by substitutions of net proﬁts and public good supplies into
the compensating contribution schedules.
22One ﬁrm lobbying both regions and the other lobbying abroad (BO)
Suppose that ﬁrm α chooses B and ﬁrm β chooses O. Policy makers maximize:
V DBO
a = µ(Wa − Sαb + Sβa)+( 1− µ)(Sαa + Sβa), (62)
V DBO
b = µ(Wb − Sβa + Sαb)+( 1− µ)Sαb, (63)
from which:
˜ gDBO
a =ˆ gD +2 f2 +2 m(h2 + f2), (64)
˜ gDBO
b =ˆ gD +2 ( 1+m)f2. (65)
Assume now that ﬁrm β does not lobby. Hence the game is BN, policy makers maximize (48) and
















for πβa we get the equilibrium proﬁts that a ﬁrm makes abroad when lobbying only abroad while
the other ﬁrm is lobbying both regions (see Table 3). Assume now that ﬁrm α does not lobby.
Policy makers maximize:
V DNO
a = µ(Wa + Sβa)+( 1− µ)Sβa, (66)
V DNO
b = µ(Wb − Sβa), (67)
from which:
˜ gDNO
a =ˆ gD +2 ( 1+m)f2, (68)
˜ gDNO
































for παa and παb we get the equilibrium proﬁts that a ﬁrm lobbying both regions makes at home and
abroad when the other ﬁrm is lobbying only abroad (see Table 3). Finally, equilibrium contributions
for the game BO (see Table 4) are computed by substitutions of net proﬁts and public good supplies
into the compensating contribution schedules.
One ﬁrm lobbying both regions and the other no lobbying (BN)
Suppose that ﬁrm α chooses B and β chooses N. Policy makers maximize (48) and (49) and the
solutions are (50) and (51). Assume now that ﬁrm α is not lobbying. Policy makers maximize
V DNN
a = µWa and V DNN
b = µWb. The solution is the no-lobbying optimal public good supply ˆ gD































for παa and παb we get the equilibrium proﬁts that a ﬁrm lobbying both regions makes at home
and abroad when the other ﬁrm is not lobbying (see Table 3). Proﬁts at home and abroad of
the no-lobbying ﬁrm β are computed by substituting the optimal public good supplies into the
corresponding proﬁt functions. Finally, equilibrium contributions for the game BN (see Table 4)
are computed by simple substitutions of net proﬁts and public good supplies into the compensating
contribution schedules of ﬁrm α.
23Both ﬁrms lobbying only the home region (II)
When both ﬁrms lobby only the home region, the policy makers’ objective functions are (26) and
(27) in the text. By maximizing (26) with respect to ga and (27) with respect to gb,w eg e tt h e
optimal public good supplies ˜ gDII in (28). To compute the equilibrium proﬁts, assume that β
lobbies at home (I), while α does not lobby (N). Policy makers maximize (58) and (59), and the















for the home proﬁts παa, and then adding the “abroad” proﬁts, f2˜ gDII,w eg e tt o t a lp r o ﬁts ˜ πDII
in (29). Equilibrium contributions, shown in Table 4, are obtained by substituting (home) net
proﬁts and public good supply into ﬁrm α’s compensating contribution schedule to region a.
One ﬁrm lobbying the home region and the other lobbying abroad (IO)
Suppose that ﬁrm α chooses I and ﬁrm β chooses O. Policy makers maximize:
V DIO
a = µ(Wa + Sβa)+( 1− µ)(Sαa + Sβa), (70)
V DIO
b = µ(Wb − Sβa), (71)
and the solutions are:
˜ gDIO
a =ˆ gD +2 f2 +2 m(h2 + f2), (72)
˜ gDIO
b =ˆ gD. (73)
Assume now that ﬁrm α does not lobby while ﬁrm β lobbies at home, so that the game is NO.












a , ˜ gDNO
b ,πβa
¢
for παa we obtain the equilibrium proﬁts that a ﬁrm makes at home when lobbying at home only
while the other ﬁrm is lobbying away only. Next we assume that ﬁrm α lobbies at home while ﬁrm
β does not lobby. Policy makers maximize:
V DIN
a = µWa +( 1− µ)Sαa, (74)
V DIN
b = µWb, (75)
and optimal public goods supplies are:
˜ gDIN
a =ˆ gD +2 mh2, (76)
˜ gDIN
















for πβa we obtain the proﬁts that a ﬁrm make abroad when lobbying only abroad whereas the
other ﬁrm is lobbying only at home. Equilibrium contributions for the game IO (see Table 4) are
computed by substituting net proﬁts and public good supplies into the corresponding contribution
schedules.
One ﬁrm lobbying the home region and the other no lobbying (IN)
Suppose that ﬁrm β chooses I and ﬁrm α chooses N. Policy makers maximize (58) and (59) and
the solutions are (60) and (61). Assuming that ﬁrm β is not lobbying, policy makers maximize
24V DNN
a = µWa and V DNN
b = µWb. The solution is the no-lobbying optimal public good supply ˆ gD
















for πβb we get the equilibrium proﬁts that a ﬁrm makes at home when lobbying only at home
while the other ﬁrm is not lobbying (see Table 3). Firm β’s proﬁts abroad, and proﬁts at home
and abroad of the no-lobbying ﬁrm α are computed by substituting the optimal public good supplies
into the corresponding proﬁt functions. Equilibrium contributions for the game IN (see Table 4)
are computed by substituting net proﬁts and public good supplies into ﬁrm β’s compensating
contribution schedule.
Both ﬁrms lobbying only abroad (OO)
When both ﬁrms lobby only abroad, the policy makers’ objective functions are (30) and (31) in
the text. By maximizing (30) with respect to ga and (31) with respect to gb,w eg e tt h eo p t i m a l
public good supplies ˜ gDOO in (32). Assume now that ﬁrm α does not lobby while ﬁrm β lobbies
abroad. The game is NO, policy makers maximize (66) and (67), and the solutions are (68) and















for παb we obtain the equilibrium proﬁts that a ﬁrm makes abroad when both ﬁrms are lobbying
abroad only (see Table 3). Adding the home proﬁts, we get total proﬁts ˜ πDOO shown in (33).
Equilibrium contributions, shown in Table 4, are computed by substituting (abroad) net proﬁts
and public good supply into ﬁrm α’s compensating contribution schedule to region b.
One ﬁrm lobbying abroad and the other no lobbying (ON)
Suppose that ﬁrm β chooses O and ﬁrm α chooses N. Policy makers maximize (66) and (67) and
the solutions are (68) and (69). Assuming that ﬁrm β is not lobbying, policy makers maximize
V DNN
a = µWa and V DNN
b = µWb. The solution is the no-lobbying optimal public good supply ˆ gD












a , ˆ gD
b
¢
for πβa we obtain the equilibrium proﬁts that a ﬁrm earns abroad when lobbying only abroad while
the other ﬁrm is no lobbying (see Table 3). Firm β’s proﬁts at home, and proﬁts at home and
abroad of the no-lobbying ﬁrm α are computed by substituting the optimal public good supplies
into the corresponding proﬁt functions. Equilibrium contributions for the game ON (see Table
4) are computed by substituting net proﬁts and public good supply into ﬁrm β’s contribution
schedule.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
From the where-to-lobby game in Table 1, one can see that for µ 6=1s t r a t e g yN is strictly
dominated by strategy I,s i n c e∆πIj−∆πNj = mh4 > 0 for all j ∈ {B,I,O,N}.H e n c eb o t hﬁrms
never play strategy N.S i n c e∆πBi − ∆πIi =( m − m−1)f4, ∆πBi − ∆πOi = mh4 − (1 + m−1)f4
and ∆πIi − ∆πOi = mh4 − (1 + m)f4 for all i ∈ {B,I,O}, all the Nash equilibria of the game
are in dominant strategies. Next, it is ∆πBi = ∆πIi iﬀ µ = 1
2, ∆πBi = ∆πOi iﬀ µ = µBO(δ;c)
deﬁn e di n( 3 4 ) ,a n d∆πIi = ∆πOi iﬀ µ = µIO(δ;c)d e ﬁned in (35). Plain algebra shows that
both µBO(δ;c)a n dµIO(δ;c) are monotonically increasing in δ,t h a tµBO(1;c)=( 3−
√
5)/2 ≈ .38,
µBO(δmax;c)=1 ,µIO(1;c)=0 ,µIO(δmax;c) = 1, and that the three curves µ = 1
2, µ = µBO(δ;c)
and µ = µIO(δ;c) have a unique intersection at δ = ˜ δ(c)d e ﬁned in (36). These properties imply
that if ∆πBi−∆πIi ≥ 0( i . e .µ ≤ 1
2)a n d∆πBi−∆πOi ≥ 0( i . e .µ ≤ µBO), then B is the dominant
strategy for each player. Thus BB is the unique Nash equilibrium of the “where-to-lobby” game.
25If ∆πBi−∆πIi < 0 (i.e. µ>1
2)a n d∆πIi−∆πOi ≥ 0 (i.e. µ ≤ µIO) the unique Nash equilibrium
in dominant strategies is II. Finally, if ∆πBi − ∆πOi < 0 (i.e. µ>µ BO)a n d∆πIi − ∆πOi < 0
(i.e. µ>µ IO) the Nash equilibrium is OO. ¥
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
From Table 1 it is ∆πBB − ∆πII =2 ( 1+m)h2f2 +( m − m−1)f4 and ∆πBB − ∆πOO = mh4 +
2mh2f2 − (1 + m−1)f4.F o rµ<1
2, ∆πBB > ∆πII,s i n c em>m −1,a n d∆πBB > ∆πOO,s i n c e
2m>1+m−1 and h ≥ f, implying that when the strategy pair BB is a Nash equilibrium it is also
Pareto eﬃcient. For µ ≥ 1
2, we need to compare the equilibria II and OO.F r o m∆πII−∆πOO ≥ 0
it is µ ≤ µE(δ;c) ≡
h4−f4
h4+2h2f2,w h e r eµE(δ;c) is monotonically increasing in δ,w i t hµE(1;c)=0 ,
µE(δmax;c) = 1, and such that, see eq. (35), µE(δ;c) <µ IO(δ;c) for all δ ∈ [1,δmax]. Hence, since
µIO(δ;c)d e ﬁnes the boundary between the Nash equilibria II and OO,t h es t r a t e g yp a i rII is
Pareto eﬃcient if and only if µ ≤ µE(δ;c), provided that µE ≥ 1
2. ¥
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
As for the comparison of net proﬁts, using (20), (25), (29) and (33) it is ˜ πC−˜ πDBB =( 2 + m−1)f4 ≥
0, ˜ πC − ˜ πDII =2 ( 1+m)h2f2 +(2+m)f4 ≥ 0a n d˜ πC − ˜ πDOO = mh4 +2mh2f2 +f4 > 0, which
shows that proﬁts are higher under centralization. As for contributions, from (21) and Table 4, it
is ˜ sDBB
αa +˜ sDBB
αb − ˜ sC =( 2+m−1)f4 ≥ 0, ˜ sC − ˜ sDII
αa = mf4 ≥ 0a n d˜ sC − ˜ sDOO
αb = mh4 − f4.
From the latter one obtains that ˜ sC ≥ ˜ sDOO
αb iﬀ µ ≤ µS(δ;c) ≡ h4
h4+f4. µS(δ;c) is monotonically
increasing in δ,w i t hµS(1;c)=1
2, µS(δmax;c)=1 ,a n dt h a tµS(δ;c) >µ IO(δ;c), meaning that
t h er e g i o ni nw h i c hOO is a Nash equilibrium is divided into two areas: ˜ sC < ˜ sDOO
αb ,f o rµ>µ S;
˜ sC ≥ ˜ sDOO
αb , otherwise. As for public good provision and social welfare, from (18) and (24) it is
ˆ gC =˜ gDBB, which implies that aggregate social welfare is the same under centralization and under
the equilibria BB. By the comparison of (18) and (28) it follows that ˜ gDII ≤ ˆ gC; aggregate social
welfare is larger in the decentralized equilibrium II since
¯ ¯˜ gDII − ˆ gC¯ ¯ ≤
¯ ¯˜ gC − ˆ gC¯ ¯,g i v e nt h a tˆ gC
maximizes social welfare, which is quadratic in public goods supply. Finally, using (18) and (32)
one can see that ˜ gDOO < ˆ gC; aggregate social welfare is larger in the decentralized equilibrium
OO since 0 ≤ ˜ gDOO − ˆ gC ≤ ˜ gC − ˆ gC. ¥
B Appendix: Lobbying for the market
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We ﬁrst derive the optimal public goods levels by maximizing WJaKb = WJaKb
a + W
JaKb
b , J,K =














Monopoly proﬁts when supplying the home and the foreign region are 3H4 and 3F4, respectively.
Thus, given SH
ρ and SF
ρ ,w i t h0≤ SH
ρ ≤ 3H4 and 0 ≤ SF
ρ ≤ 3F4, the politician’s value functions
in the four possible cases are
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Figure 3: An illustration of Proposition 4
Consider ﬁrm α (the same argument holds true for ﬁrm β). Given SH
β and SF
β the government
chooses HaHb iﬀ V HaHb ≥ V HaFb, V HaHb ≥ V FaHb, V HaHb ≥ V FaFb; after some algebra these
inequalities reduce to SH
α ≥ TH(SF






















Analogously one gets that the government chooses FaFb iﬀ SH
α ≤ TH(SF
β )a n dSF




β )a n dSF
α >TF(SH
β ), and FaHb iﬀ SH
α <T H(SF
β )a n dSF
α <T F(SH
β ). The
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β ) and SF
α ≥ TF(SH
β ),









β ) and SF
α <T F(SH
β ).
Proﬁt maximization requires the ﬁrm to set SH
α = TH(SF
β )+ε and SF
α = TF(SH
β )+ε,w i t hε > 0
as close as possible to zero. Since the same proﬁt maximizing behavior holds true for ﬁrm β,t h e
two ﬁrms will engage in a Bertrand-type competition in contributions, leading to the unique Nash
equilibrium (pure) strategy proﬁle: ˆ SF
ρ =3 F4 and ˆ SH




,w i t hˆ TH = TH(ˆ SF
ρ )a s
deﬁn e di n( 4 3 ) . ¥
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4
From ˆ TH =0 ,w i t h ˆ T H deﬁned in (43), we get
µ2(δ;c)=
4F4
F4 +3 H4, (78)
where H and F are deﬁned in (37). Eq. (78) divides the closed set S =( µ,δ) ∈ [0,1] × [1,δmax]
in two regions (see Figure 3): ˆ SH > 0f o rµ<µ 2,a n dˆ SH =0o t h e r w i s e . µ2(δ;c) ∈ C2 is
monotonically decreasing in δ,w i t hµ2(1;c)=1a n dµ2(δmax;c)= 4
49 = .082.
From
ˆ V hf − µ
9H4
2




3F4 +[ ( h + f)2 +2 ( h2 + f2)]2, (79)




49,a n dt h a tµ1(δ;c)a n dµ2(δ;c) have a unique intersection at δ = δ1(c) ≡ 5+17c
22c
for δ ∈ [1,δmax), for which µ = 334084
786289
∼ = .425. Thus, for δ ∈ [1,δ1], the locus deﬁned by eq. (79)
separates the subset of S in which ˆ SH > 0 into two subsets such that: ˆ V hf > ˆ V H for µ>µ 1 and
ˆ V hf ≤ ˆ V H otherwise, proving the ﬁrst part of the proposition. For δ ∈ (δ1,δmax), if µ ≤ µ1 then
ˆ V hf < ˆ V H since µ1 >µ 2.I f µ>µ 2 then ˆ SH =0 . D e ﬁne Ψ(µ,δ;c)=ˆ V hf − µ9H4
4 , Ψ ∈ C2.
Since Ψ(µ,1;c) > 0, Ψ(µ,δmax;c) = 0 and there is a unique root at δ = δ1 for δ ∈ [1,δmax), then
Ψ < 0 for all δ ∈ (δ1,δmax), proving that only the home ﬁrm enters the market without paying
any contribution. ¥
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2
T h ep r o o fi sc o n d u c t e di nt h r e es t e p s .T h eﬁrst step proves the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h el e m m aa n dd e r i v e s
the politicians’ value functions when one ﬁrm only is allowed into each regional market. The second
and third steps derive the politicians’ value functions in the remaining cases.
Step 1. Both regional governments admit one ﬁrm only. By deriving the optimal public goods
levels through the maximization in ga and gb, respectively, of WJaKb
a and W
JaKb
b , J,K = {H,F},
as deﬁned in (38)—(41), and given SH
ρ and SF
ρ , ρ = {α,β},w i t h0≤ SH
ρ ≤ 3H4 and 0 ≤ SF
ρ ≤ 3F4,















α +( 1− µ)SH













β + µ¯ y.
Given SF
β , it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for region a (and symmetrically the same holds
true for region b) to choose the home ﬁrm iﬀ V HaHb
a ≥ V FaHb
a and V HaFb
a ≥ V FaFb
a .T h e s e t w o
inequalities are satisﬁed for the same condition, i.e.
SH
α (SF












Bertrand competition in contributions implies that ˆ SF
ρ = F4 and thus it is
ˆ SH











proving equation (45) in the lemma. One needs to check that ˆ SH
ρ ≤ 3H4.F o rµ 6= 1, this requires
µ(δ) ≤ µT (δ) ≡ 43H4−F 4
3H4+F 4. By recalling (37), it is immediate to show that it is µT (1) = 2 and
∂µ
T(δ)
∂δ > 0. Hence ˆ SH
ρ is always smaller than the proﬁts realized in the home region.
Thus, when only one ﬁrm is allowed to enter a regional market, the home ﬁrm wins the contest for
the market and the politician’s value function (in each region) is ˆ V HaHb
a in Table 2.
Step 2. Both regional governments allow both ﬁrms in their market. This case has been examined
in section 3, where policy without lobbying has been described. Using the optimal public good
provision given in (13) and substituting it into (10), region a politician’s value function when both
28ﬁrms are allowed to enter their market is ˆ V hfahfb
a ,s h o w ni nT a b l e2 .
Step 3. One regional government admits one ﬁrm only and the other one admits both. Suppose,
without loss of generality, that region a lets both ﬁrms in, while region b allows only one of them














































By maximizing each regional social welfare function in the local public good supply, one obtains
the corresponding politicians’ value functions
ˆ V hfaHb
a = µ










































By Bertrand competition, ˆ SF
α = F4 and
ˆ SH












β > 0f o rµ< 4F 4
9H4−F 4. Moreover, by the same argument in Step 2, ˆ SH




b the region b politician’s value function is ˆ V
hfaHb
b in Table 2. The
same applies symmetrically when region b let both ﬁrms in, while region a allows only one of them
to enter its regional market. ¥
B.4 Proof of Proposition 6
Considering the game in Table 2, it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for both regions to admit one
ﬁrm only iﬀ ˆ V hfaHb
a ≥ ˆ V hf
a and ˆ V HaHb
a ≥ ˆ V hfaHb
a . These inequalities imply (i) µ ≤ µ6(δ;c) ≡
4F 4
[(h+f)2+2h2]2 for µ<µ 5(δ;c), where µ5(δ;c)i sd e ﬁn e di n( 4 6 ) ,a n d( i i )µ{9H4−[(h+f)2+2h2]2} ≥ 0
for µ ≥ µ5(δ;c). Condition (ii) is always satisﬁed for all δ ∈ [1,δmax]a n dc ∈ (0,1); hence one-ﬁrm
in each region is the unique Nash equilibrium for µ ≥ µ5(δ;c). As for condition (i), it is always
satisﬁed for all δ ∈ [1,δmax]a n dc ∈ (0,1), since µ6(δ;c) ≥ µ5(δ;c). The latter inequality follows




and µ6(δ;c) 6= µ5(δ;c) for all δ ∈ [1,δmax). Hence one-ﬁrm in each region is the unique Nash
equilibrium also for µ<µ 5(δ;c). In both cases, by Lemma 2, it is the home ﬁrm to gain access to
the market. ¥
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